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I. INTRODUCTION:
In 2015, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that
65.3 million people were forcibly displaced from their homes. Of these numbers, 21.3 million are
refugees, half of whom are under the age of 18. Today, approximately 34,000 people are forcibly
displaced every day as a result of conflict or persecution,2 making this an issue of international
concern. The question of refugees is one that has risen to prominence over the past few years,
especially since the Arab Spring in 2011. According to a comprehensive report for 2014 by
UNHCR, the number of refugees, asylum seekers and people forced to flee within their own
countries reached nearly 60 million, which when compared to the latest figures indicates an
upward trend. The UNHCR was created in 1950 to support Europeans who were displaced by
World War II. However, most of the current flow of refugees is from the Middle East and subSaharan Africa. Among countries, Syria is the biggest contributor of refugees: in 2014, 1 in 5
displaced people worldwide was Syrian. Additionally, Somalia is the source of more than a
million refugees, which makes up the world’s third-highest total.3
Congruent with the rise in refugees has been the rise in anti-refugee sentiments. Several
wealthy countries across the globe have had a tough response, largely due to political pressure
among populations that are hostile to the influx of migrants. France and Austria have stepped up
police checks at crossings with Italy, leaving migrants to camp out at train stations in Rome and
Milan. In 2015, Hungary announced plans to build a 12-foot fence along its border with Serbia.

2

“Figures at a Glance,” UNHCR, last accessed on March 20, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figuresat-a-glance.html.
3
Griff Witte, “New U.N. report says world’s refugee crisis is worse than anyone expected,” The
Washington Post, June 18, 2015, last accessed on April 16, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/new-un-report-says-worlds-refugee-crisis-is-worse-thananyone-expected/2015/06/17/a49c3fc0-14ff-11e5-84574b431bf7ed4c_story.html?utm_term=.250f5d19ea94.

6

As a result, the vast majority of refugees in 2014 were hosted by poor countries, with nearly 9
out of 10 refugees living in the developing world. This has led to several appeals by UNHCR,
other aid groups and even Pope Francis for a more equitable share of the burden and a
cooperative approach to dealing with the global challenge.4
Europe has been the focus of this dilemma, given its proximity to refugee-generating
countries and rise in anti-refugee sentiments in several of its countries. Over 1 million refugees,
displaced persons and other migrants have made their way to the European Union (EU), escaping
conflict in their country and in search of better economic prospects. According to UNHCR, by
June 2016, approximately 156,000 people had reached Europe since the start of the year. Many
of them arrived after perilous land or sea journeys, in search of basic humanitarian assistance,
such as provision of clean water, healthcare, emergency shelter and legal aid.5 Under these
circumstances, European views on refugees have gained importance. Many Europeans are
concerned that the influx of refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism and impose a
burden on their countries.6 However, this threat assessment varies from country to country, with
majorities in Poland, Hungary, Greece and Italy of the view that refugees from places like Iraq
and Syria are a major threat to their countries. On the other hand, only a third or less of people in

4

Ibid.
“Refugee crisis in Europe,” European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, European
Commission, last accessed on April 16, 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en.
6
On a more positive note, only a relatively small share of Europeans – a median of 30% across 9
countries – felt that refugees were more to blame than other groups for crime in their countries.
5
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Germany and Sweden – two countries that have taken in a large number of migrants – share their
view.7
In an attempt to measure worldwide
friendliness towards refugees, Amnesty
International conducted the Refugee Welcome
Index survey in 2016. The survey ranked 27
countries across all continents centered on
people’s willingness to let refugees live in
their countries, towns, neighborhoods and
homes. Based on the results, countries were
placed on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0
means that all respondents would refuse
refugees entry to the country and 100 implies
that all respondents would accept refugees into their neighborhood or home. The survey was
carried out by a strategy consultancy firm, GlobeScan, and asked more than 27,000 people their
level of agreement with the following questions:
1)   People should be able to take refuge in other countries to escape from war or
persecution.
2)   Our government should do more to help refugees fleeing war or persecution.

7

Jacob Poushter, “European opinions of the refugee crisis in 5 charts,” Pew Research Center, September
16, 2016, last accessed on April 16, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/europeanopinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/.
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3)   How closely would you personally accept people fleeing war or persecution? Would
you let them live in your household? In your neighborhood? In your city, town or
village? In your country? Or would you refuse them entry to your country?8
The results showed China, Germany and the UK as the most welcoming countries with regards
to refugees, with 85, 84 and 83, respectively, out of 100 people willing to accept refugees into
their neighborhoods and homes. Russia is the least welcoming of all the 27 countries that were
surveyed, with 82 people out of 100, ready to refuse refugees entry into the country. Out of the
European countries surveyed, France is the least welcoming nation, excluding Turkey, and
Germany is the most welcoming country.
While the robustness of the study might be called into question due to the small sample
size within each country – a sample size of a 1,000 people in each country – the French and
German results, relative to each other, are supported by other studies. For example, a survey
published by Pew Research Center confirms that 14% more people in France view refugees from
Syria and Iraq as a major threat to their country than in Germany.9 The following section will
contextualize these sentiments with respect to the current refugee situation in the two countries.
Understanding the Refugee Situation in France and Germany:
With the Brexit, France and Germany are the two key players in Europe, and
understanding their stance on the refugee crisis will shed more light on the situation in Europe –
a region that is important given the prevalence of the refugee question in the continent. To this

8

“Refugees Welcome Survey 2016 – The Results,” Amnesty International, May 19, 2016, last accessed
on April 16, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/refugees-welcome-survey-results2016/?utm_content=buffer9a8d4&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
.
9
“Many Europeans see refugees from Syria and Iraq as a major threat,” Pew Research Center, September
13, 2016, last accessed on March 20, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/europeanopinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/ft_16-09-09_refugeeseurope_map/.
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end, I graphed the number of refugees in both France and Germany, and compared them to the
number of asylum applications that they received from 1990 till 2015.10_11_12_13 This is
illustrative of the pressure on the country during the refugee crisis, since it shows the trends in
the refugee population already within the country along with the popularity of the country
amongst new asylum seekers.

300,000	
  

80,000	
  
70,000	
  

Number	
  of	
  refugees

250,000	
  

60,000	
  
200,000	
  

50,000	
  

150,000	
  

40,000	
  
30,000	
  

100,000	
  

20,000	
  
50,000	
  

10,000	
  
-‐
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

-‐

Number	
  of	
  asylum	
  applications	
  received

Chart	
   1:	
  Refugee	
  Population	
  and	
   Asylum	
   Applications	
  -‐ France

Year
Refugee	
  Population

Asylum	
  Seekers

10

Data on Refugee Population: “Refugee population by country or territory of asylum,” The World Bank,
last accessed on February 20, 2017,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG?end=2014&start=1991.
11
Data on Asylum Applications 1990-2006: Piotr Juchno, “Asylum applications in the European Union,”
Statistics in focus 110 (2007): 3, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5285137/KS-SF-07110-EN.PDF/c95cc2ce-b50c-498e-95fb-cd507ef29e27.
12
Data on Asylum Applications 1998-2007: “Asylum applicants by citizenship till 2007 Annual data
(rounded),” Eurostat, last updated on May 8, 2015,
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyctz&lang=en.
13
Data on Asylum Applications 2008-2016: “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age
and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded),” Eurostat, last updated on March 13, 2017,
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en.
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Chart 1 shows the refugee population in France steadily increasing from 193,000
refugees in 1990 to 273,126 in 2015. If the trends are broken down further, the number of
refugees were on a downward trend in the 1990s, meaning that refugees were either leaving
France or were being made to leave France. Supporting this decline was an observed fall in the
number of asylum applications that the country received. Looking back to this period, it is
plausible that the spike in refugees can be attributed to the Bosnian crisis of the 1990s Balkan
wars, when approximately 2 million refugees fled west. They were granted temporary asylum in
the west, and were required to return once the conflict subsided.14 Thus, the number of refugees
fell because they were going back to their original countries once the situation stabilized.
Starting in 2002, the number of refugees in the country started increasing again, matched by an
increase in the number of asylum applications starting from 2006 onwards. This is due to the
new wave of refugees stemming from former French colonies in North Africa and the Middle
East, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

14

Alexander Casella, “Europe faces two refugee crises,” Financial Times, June 16, 2015, last accessed on
April 16, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/a0a64e38-1432-11e5-9bc5-00144feabdc0.

11

Number	
  of	
  refugees

1,600,000	
  

600,000	
  

1,400,000	
  

500,000	
  

1,200,000	
  
400,000	
  

1,000,000	
  
800,000	
  

300,000	
  

600,000	
  

200,000	
  

400,000	
  
100,000	
  

200,000	
  

-‐
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

-‐

Year
Refugee	
  Population

Number	
  of	
  asylum	
  applications	
  received

Chart	
   2:	
  Refugee	
  Population	
  and	
   Asylum	
   Applications	
  -‐
Germany

Asylum	
  Seekers

Chart 2 shows a gradual decrease in the number of refugees in Germany from 816,000 in
1990 to 316,115 in 2015. Breaking this down further, there was an increase in numbers till 1993,
after which the population has been on a steady decline. The number of asylum applications have
also followed the same trend during the specified time, indicating that this was again due to the
Balkan Wars. The number of applications received by Germany started increasing from 2008
onwards, but it wasn’t until 2013 that this increase reflected in the refugee population. In 2015,
the number of applications exceeded the number of refugees in the country by more than
160,000.
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In comparing the number of asylum applications that the two countries received over the
years in Chart 3, France has witnessed a slow increase, whereas Germany has shown a lot of
variability, with two peaks: one in 1992 and the other in 2015. The first peak was during the
Balkan Wars when Germany had a favorable policy for refugees stemming from its World War
II guilt.15 Additionally, the higher numbers as compared to France is also because Germany is
closer to Eastern Europe, the region generating refugees during this time, than France. The
second peak is a direct consequence of Angela Merkel’s vocal pro-refugee attitudes in recent
years,16 which have led more refugees to apply to Germany.

15

German World War II guilt refers to Germany’s penitence regarding the atrocities committed by the
Third Reich during World War II, and the Federal Republic of Germany’s subsequent attempts to make
amends for the same through compensations to victims and asks for forgiveness. (Thomas U. Berger,
“Germany: The Model Penitent,” in War, Guilt, And World Politics After World War II (Cambridge: New
York, 2012), 35-82.)
16
Esther King, “Angela Merkel: No refugee cap in Germany,” POLITICO, December 1, 2016, last
accessed on April 16, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-no-refugee-migrants-cap-ingermany/.
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In Chart 4, I scaled the total refugee population in each of the countries to their total
population.17 Again, we see that Germany experienced a growth during the Balkan Wars, after
which the population has been steadily decreasing, whereas it has stayed the same for France,
with a slight increase in recent years. Currently the two countries are near the same level of
scaled refugee population, with refugees making up approximately 0.4% of their total
population. Both countries’ trends can be explained by the composition of the international flow
of refugees. In the 1990s, a large proportion of the international flow of refugees was comprised
of Eastern Europeans. 18 Given that Germany’s population comprises mostly of people of
European descent19 and that one reaches Germany before France while walking from east to

17

Data on Total Population: “Population, total,” The World Bank, last accessed on February 20, 2017,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2015&name_desc=false&start=1990.
18
“Refugee Population by country or territory of origin,” The World Bank, last accessed on March 24,
2017, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG.OR?end=2014&start=1990.
19
“Germany Ethnic groups,” IndexMundi, last accessed on March 24, 2017,
http://www.indexmundi.com/germany/ethnic_groups.html.
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west, it is logical that Germany received a lot more asylum applications during the Balkan wars,
and accepted more refugees than France.
In recent years, the number of Europeans in the flow have decreased and people from the
Middle East and North Africa compose majority of the flow.20 As will be illustrated in Chapter 2,
these regions share a colonial past with France, which explains the slow rise in refugees in the
country as well as the number of asylum applications received. The slow rise in France can be
distinguished from Germany’s sudden increases since it is a consequence of a shared historical
past that provides consistency, thereby increasing the number of refugees over the years.
Germany’s peaks, on the other hand, are due to external shocks which led to consequent
increases. Additionally, the increase in the number of refugees in France is because it is more
easily accessible to people coming from the Middle East and Africa than Germany since it
borders the Mediterranean Sea. In this manner, consideration of the two countries’ historical ties
and locational characteristics thus help us understand their refugee reality. In the following
chapter, I will discuss France and Germany’s unique histories that give them a personal stake in
the refugee crisis. However, prior to that, in the next section, I will introduce the two-level game
that influences government decisions, which forms the foundation for the rest of the paper.
The Two-Level Game:
National governments are faced with the daunting task of balancing domestic interests at
the international level. This is especially pronounced for countries with some form of
representative democracy, since leaders in power want to maintain favor with their constituents.
Robert Putnam theorizes the relationship between international and domestic politics as a “twolevel game”: at a national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the

20

“Refugee Population by country or territory of origin.”
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government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions
among those groups, while at the international level, national governments seek to maximize
their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimizing the adverse consequences of
foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers so
long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign,21 as is true in the case of France and
Germany.
Over the years, scholars have recognized that central decision makers, i.e. “the state,”
must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and international pressures. In his argument,
Putnam identifies that domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations must
stress “politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and non-economic),
legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional
arrangements.”22 The process of negotiating is broken down into two levels:
1.   The first level comprises of bargaining between the negotiators at the international level,
leading to a tentative agreement. This level is called Level I, or the negotiation phase.
2.   The second level refers to separate discussion within each group of constituents about
whether to ratify the agreement. This is called Level II, or the ratification phase. The
actors in this level are not only limited to the parliament, but may also represent
bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or public opinion.23
The complexity of the game portrayed by Putnam demonstrates the interplay between the
two levels. While Putnam’s paper is concerned with coming up with a formula for determining

21

Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International
Organization 42.3 (1988): 427-460, last accessed on April 16, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.oberlin.edu/stable/pdf/2706785.pdf.
22
Ibid, 431-432.
23
Ibid, 436.
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when an international treaty or negotiation will be successful, I will be using his insight to
understand the approach that the French and German governments have taken to respond to their
refugee pressures. The chief negotiator, or the state, must not only be aware of the kinds of
outcomes and positions that will be acceptable back in the country, but also gauge the sentiment
of other actors in the international sphere. Putnam hypothesizes that the determinants of a “winset” or a successful international agreement are based on the preferences and coalitions that
prevail at Level II and the institutions at Level II, as well as the Level I negotiators’ strategies.24
Therefore, it can be surmised that the actions that a government takes is that government’s “winset,” since it was taken after careful consideration of the game at both levels.
My aim in this paper is to study the determinants of the Level I and Level II games facing
the French and German governments, to understand their policies better. Using Putnam’s
components of a “win-set” as my framework, I will be analyzing public opinion at the domestic
level in order to understand the preferences that prevail, government structure and election data
as variables for institutions at Level II, and both countries’ commitments at the international
level for negotiating strategies pursued by them in Level I. Since the refugee levels in countries
are the result of the implementation of government policy and the country’s law, I will be using
the number of refugees in each country from 1990 to 2015 as an indicator of government action.
Structure of the Paper:
The focus of this paper is to explain the number of refugees residing in France and
Germany as a result of the domestic and international pressures facing the governments.
However, in order to do this, it is necessary to understand the domestic and international
pressures facing the countries in the first place. At the international level, France and Germany

24

Ibid, 442.

17

are both signatories of various international conventions on refugees, which have influenced
their own laws regarding asylum seekers and refugees. As Putnam theorized, their accession to
the conventions are a result of their domestic pressures, and imply that the international norms
are in line with their domestic goals. Chapter II describes the unique histories and motivations of
the two countries that lend them an interest in the refugee crisis, and thus, in signing onto the
international conventions, while in Chapter III, I will expound on these international
commitments and analyze their influence on the countries’ laws. Chapter IV includes a
regression analysis, which comprises of variables that are indicative of domestic and
international pressures. The goal of the regression is to determine which factors were significant
in the government’s decision to admit the number of refugees that they did in the country.
Following Chapter IV is the conclusion that sums up the findings presented in the paper and
illustrates scope for further study in the topic.

18

II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT:
The refugee problem poses an interesting puzzle: why are sovereign countries willing to
act with goodwill, especially when it comes to helping individual people to whom they have no
obligations? This is an important question since it provides insight into the motivations for
governments entering refugee conventions and honoring their commitments. Some theorists have
explained this as a way for countries to seek praises and benefits for ratification within the
existing international human rights regime that rewards support.25 However, I will also argue that
Germany and France have a vested interest in the refugee crisis due to their unique pasts that not
only shape their refugee realities differently but also led to the formation of the European Union
(EU), which further anchors the humanitarian spirit in them. Additionally, national desires to be
leaders at the international level should also ideally incentivize France and Germany to accede to
international norms for protecting refugees at a governmental level. In this chapter, I will
develop these ideas and expand on how aiding refugees fits into the personal narratives of the
two countries and the larger history of the EU.
National Histories of France and Germany:
As Chapter 3 will expand further, France and Germany are faced with a rather
homogenous structure at the international level regarding the refugee crisis, so they should be
responding to the call for humanitarian aid in the same way. This suggests that we should be
seeing welcoming indicators in both countries, but as the discussion of the refugee situation in
France and Germany in Chapter 1 illustrated, there are variations in the way that the two
countries have responded to the crisis. These variations can be explained by the different

25

Richard A. Nielsen and Beth A. Simmons, “Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the
International Human Rights Regime,” International Studies Quarterly 59 (2015), 198, last accessed on
April 16, 2017, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/isqu.12142/epdf.
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historical experiences of both countries, which also provide legitimizing objectives in acting with
goodwill towards individual people who flee war, destruction and persecution in their own
countries.
French connection to the current refugee crisis is through its former colonies. Chart 5
shows the international flows of refugees from former French colonies in Africa and the Middle
East, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, the
Republic of Congo, Comoros, Djibouti, Algeria, Gabon, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Madagascar,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Seychelles, Sudan, Syrian Arab
Republic, Chad, Togo and Tunisia.26_27 As is visible in the graph, refugee flows from former
French colonies have increased nearly seven times since 2011. When plotted with the number of
asylum applications that France received over the years,28_29_30 we see a sharp increase since
2006. This trend will only strengthen further given that former French colonies contributed to
approximately 6.5 million refugees in 2015. Therefore, French connection to the crisis cannot be
denied.
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The French colonizing mission lasted in Africa for almost a century and a half in the form
of a substantial colonial empire that stretched from Maghreb through the Western and Central
sub-Saharan regions. Though direct rule ended in the early 1960s, France maintained its
influence in Francophone Africa and its colonies in the Middle East through political, security,
economic and cultural connections.31 While the first three kinds of connections give France an
interest in the geographical region of Africa, the cultural dimension results in a concern for the
people of Africa. At the time when the French colonial empire was disintegrating, Charles de
Gaulle perceived “that French world power and French power in Africa were inextricably linked
and mutually confirming.” The most common way for the colonizer to create an everlasting tie is
through social engineering efforts that aimed to promote French ideals in native life, politics and
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education.32 The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) estimates that the number
of French speakers will rise from 220 million in 2012 to 715 million in 2050, 80 percent of
whom will be in Africa.33 Today, France continues to strive to maintain its cultural legacy in
Francophone Africa. Various inter-governmental organizations and conferences have “operated
under the hub of the Agence de cooperation culturelle et technique in an effort to institutionalise
the linguistic, cultural and educational links between France and francophone Africa.”34 As a
testament to the importance of cultural affinity, the ethnic composition of the country also
includes significant proportions of people from its former colonies. 35 This, in conjunction with
increasing refugee contributions from former French colonies, leads to the logical conclusion
that France has an interest in playing an important role in the current refugee crisis.
While French history provides a unique rationale to be welcoming to certain types of
populations, German experience post-World War II (WWII) provides incentive to be open to a
more general population. German WWII guilt refers to Germany’s penitence regarding the
atrocities committed by the Third Reich during World War II, and the Federal Republic of
Germany’s subsequent attempts to make amends for the same through compensations to victims
and asks for forgiveness.36 Germany still harbors a substantial sense of guilt about the country’s
WWII regime and the Holocaust, which caused enormous flows of refugees and indirectly led to
the founding of the state of Israel. After the end of WWII, more than 10 million ethnic Germans
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who fled the country during the Nazi regime flooded into the country from neighboring states.
The memories of the tragedy and horror of WWII are still fresh in the minds of the older
generation of voters, who experienced unprecedented levels of population displacement from the
country, thereby resulting in a more open-minded and accepting older generation, which is the
portion of population that tends to be more anti-immigration in other countries.37
The liberal asylum system of West Germany was again put to the test in the late 1980s
and the 1990s as war in the Balkans broke out and the Cold War came to an end.38 Even though
Germany has not changed its warm openness to refugees – a trend that is rooted in German
history surrounding WWII – it is evident from the data presented in Chapter 1 that its refugee
population has declined sharply since the refugee crisis of the 1990s. While this may imply that
guilt played a bigger role for European refugees in the half century following the end of WWII,
the increase in refugees and acceptances in the last couple of years should not be discounted;
perhaps Germany is responding to the plight of refugees with a lagged effect.
Operating in the International Context: Global Leaders with Interests in the EU project:
When the histories of the countries fall short in providing an incentive to be proactive in
the face of the refugee crisis, French and German interests in playing leadership roles at the
international level should also provide incentives to take a stance on the crisis and help refugees:
States have a desire “to avoid public criticism…[and] avoid positions in which they would stand
alone against other states, especially those with similar identities.”39 Therefore, given the
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emphasis on human rights in international politics, ideally they would not want to be caught on
the wrong side of the trend.
The legal regime for international human rights has been one of the three main pillars of
international order in the post-Cold War period, alongside international dedication to peace and
security, and trade liberalization.40 Some theorists explain human rights ratification by stressing
the importance that governments attach to the approval of the international community. “States
ratify treaties, in this view, out of a desire to ‘belong’ as a ‘member in good standing’ to the
international community of ‘modern’ nations…Governments are ‘socialized’ to care about what
other states think of them…[and] international law plays a central role in that process.”41 In light
of the emphasis on human rights in contemporary international politics, being a proponent of
refugee rights increases the countries’ social standings at the global level since the international
convention regarding refugees – the 1951 UN Convention Regarding the Status of Refugees – is
grounded in Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.42
At the European level, France and Germany play integral roles, with their histories
closely intertwined with the history of the region. Franco-German relations have been often
described as the “engine in Europe,”43 and the elimination of the “age-old opposition of France
and Germany” formed the foundation for the common European project that led to the creation
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of the EU.44 Thus, the EU is the result of an attempt to bring peace and trust to a region that has a
history of conflict. True to its mission, it has promoted laws and norms in the global context, and
“exported” rules to non-EU states concerning sensitive political issues such as human rights,
democracy, and good governance.45 Therefore, as leaders of the EU, France and Germany should
espouse EU values as a sign of their affirmation of its objectives; taking heed of the refugee
crisis and leveraging their position to do their part is integral to achieving this end.
Additionally, the European project, which sought to cement peace in the aftermath of
WWII, itself is a symbol of the humanitarian regime and provides an anchor for pursuing human
rights objectives. WWII finally ended after the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945. However, by
this time, much of Europe, Asia and parts of Africa lay in ruins. In addition to a large loss in
civilian and military lives, combat and bombing had flattened cities and towns, destroyed bridges
and railroads, and scorched the countryside. Post war countries were confronted with shortages
in food, fuel and other consumer products. Countries had spent more money on WWII than in all
previous wars combined, which further led to severe economic problems that frustrated
reconstruction efforts after the war. Inflation levels skyrocketed, war-torn Europe was in debt,
and countries were struggling to overcome their trade and balance of payments deficits. Only the
United States had emerged from the war with the strength and resources to help the regions that
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had been ravaged by war.46 Europe, which was earlier a formidable global power, now lay
weakened in the aftermath of WWII.
This was not the first time that hostilities in Europe sparked conflicts on the continent,
that later embroiled the whole world. World War I (WWI) pitted the Central Powers – mainly
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey – against the Allies, which were mainly France, Great
Britain, Russia, Italy and Japan, and from 1917, the United States. It ended with the defeat of the
Central Powers in 1918, and caused unprecedented levels of slaughter, carnage and destruction.47
The history of Europe is one of hostility, which led to bloody conflicts in the twentieth century.
Under these circumstances, Winston Churchill promoted the idea of a United States of Europe as
a way of transcending the negativity of the past, in his famous Zurich speech in 1946: “We must
all turn our backs upon the horrors of the past. We must look to the future. We cannot afford to
drag forward across the years that are to come the hatreds and revenges which have sprung from
the injuries of the past. If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final
doom, there must be an act of faith in the European family and an act of oblivion against all the
crimes and follies of the past.”48
The EU is a result of these sentiments, though its creation occurred in stages. As a means
of ensuring peace on the continent and preventing the outbreak of another war, some Western
European countries signed onto various treaties, that were refined and whose membership were
expanded over the years. This process finally culminated into the Maastricht Treaty, which

46

“Destruction and Reconstruction (1945-1958): Money Matters: An IMF Exhibit – The Importance of
Global Cooperation,” International Monetary Fund, last accessed on March 12, 2017,
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/mm/eng/mm_dr_01.htm.
47
John Graham Royde-Smith, “World War I,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, last updated on December 9,
2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I.
48
Ann Rigney, “Transforming Memory and the European Project,” New Literary History 43.4 (2012):
611, last accessed on April 16, 2017, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/497937.

26

established the EU in 1992. In 1950, Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, conceived of
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), “to make war not only unthinkable but
materially impossible.”49 In 1951, the leaders of six countries, namely Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany, signed the Treaty of Paris that founded the
ECSC when it took effect in 1952. It created a free-trade area for several key economic and
military resources, including coal, coke, steel, scrap and iron ore. Several supranational
institutions were established to oversee the ECSC – these included a High Authority to
administrate, a Council of Ministers to legislate, a Common Assembly (later renamed the
European Parliament) to formulate policy, and a Court of Justice to interpret the treaty and to
resolve related disputes. Through subsequent treaties and versions of supranational European
institutions, the EU was finally created with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 50
Having laid the groundwork for the creation of the EU, this paper is concerned with the treaties
that aimed to facilitate free movement of people as it concerns immigration.
In March 1957, the six ECSC members signed the two Treaties of Rome the latter of
which created a common market, thereby eliminating most barriers to the movement of goods,
services, capital and labor, and prohibited public policies and private agreements that inhibited
market competition, a common agricultural policy, and a common external trade policy. The
treaty required members to eliminate or revise important national laws and regulations, and
cooperate in area where countries had traditionally acted independently. It also created the
European Social Fund, which was designed to enhance job opportunities by facilitating workers’
geographic and occupational mobility. Like the ECSC, the European Economic Community
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(EEC) that was created through the first Treaty of Rome, established four major governing
institutions: a commission (European Commission or The Commission), a ministerial council
(Council of the European Union), an assembly (European Parliament), and a court (European
Court of Justice or ECJ). The EEC, European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the
ECSC, collectively referred to as the European Communities, later became the principal
institutions of the EU.51
The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 significantly expanded the EEC’s scope. It
called for more intensive coordination of foreign policy among members, though foreign policy
decisions were made outside community institutions. The SEA created the European Regional
Development Fund to encourage development of economically depressed areas, incorporated
provisions for the protection of the environment, provided a common research and technologicaldevelopment policy, and set out a timetable for the completion of a common market.52
Meanwhile, the Schengen agreement was signed in the town of Schengen in Luxembourg in
1985 and took effect in 1995. The Schengen Agreement abolished many of the EU’s internal
borders, enabling passport-free movement across most of the bloc. While the main feature of the
agreement is the creation of a single external border and a single set of rules for policing it,
common rules on asylum are also part of the agreement amongst other measures included. Under
the Schengen rules, signatories may reinstate internal border controls for 10 days due to “public
policy or national security” reasons, and a maximum extension of two years is allowed under
Article 26 of the Schengen Borders Code in “exceptional circumstances.”53
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Finally, in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty created the EU. The treaty met with substantial
resistance in some countries, but an amended version of the treaty officially took effect on
November 1, 1993. It consisted of three main pillars: 1) the European Communities, 2) a
common foreign and security policy, and 3) enhanced cooperation in domestic affairs and
justice. The EEC was changed to the European Community (EC), and had broader authority that
included formal control of community policies on development, education, public health and
consumer protection. The EC also had an increased role in environmental protection, social and
economic cohesion, and technological research. It established EU citizenships, which entailed
the right of EU citizens to vote and to run for office in local and European Parliament elections
in their country of residence, regardless of national citizenship.54 While the EU enabled free
movement of people within the EU zone, the Schengen Agreement doesn’t necessarily apply to
all EU members. However, France and Germany are signatories of the Agreement.55
As part of the Maastricht Treaty’s second and third pillars, members defined and
implemented common foreign and security policies, and worked towards free movement of
people within the EU’s border. There was an agreement that wherever possible, members would
adopt common defense policies that would be implemented through the Western European
Union, a security organization that includes many EU members. Joint actions, which were not
subject to the monitoring or enforcement by the Commission or the ECJ, required unanimity.
The conflict between national immigration, asylum and residency policies, and the elimination of
border controls featured high on the common concerns related to the free movement of people
within the EU. Since national civil codes across countries were different, it became difficult to
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combat crime and apply laws uniformly. Therefore, there was a need for new Europe-wide
policies that created a common European code for domestic affairs and justice.56
Despite its noble intentions of encouraging cooperation and peaceful resolution of
conflicts between member states, the EU model has come under a lot of criticism. The Brookings
Institution’s Robert Kagan argues that the EU has “turned ‘away from power’ and has moved
into a ‘self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiations and cooperation.’”57 However, true to its objective of discouraging war, it has not shied from power;
rather, it has broken away from the traditional exercise of power.58 By rejecting the balance of
power politics and military deterrence within the continent, integrated Europe no longer
generates insecurity but instead instills security. “Security, which was once based on
‘walls,’…came to be based on openness, transparency, mutual vulnerability, and
accountability….Security was provided by economic interdependence and delegating traditional
state powers to supranational European authorities.”59 Earlier, conflicts primarily centered on
borders and jurisdiction over them, whereby states tried to balance each other or line up behind a
hegemon. Therefore, the aim of the EU project was to overcome the “Westphalian syndrome,”
which it has been successful in doing as evidenced by the nature of contemporary conflicts that
are no longer about borders, but rather the shape of European institutions and the transgressions
of common laws. European states still maintain armies, but their purpose is not to wage wars
with other EU member states.60

56

Gabel, “European Union.”
Zielonka, “Why the World Should Worry About Europe’s Disarray,” 12.
58
Ibid, 12.
59
Ibid, 8.
60
Ibid, 8.
57

30

The integrated framework enables the EU to maintain non-threatening relations with its
non-EU neighbors too, since it is a civilian and not a military power. As a result, other European
powers like Turkey or Russia do not need to fear, balance or deter it.61 Additionally, they don’t
have to be insecure about being invaded or subjugated since territorial acquisitions by the EU
have proceeded by invitations where neighbors have been asked to adopt EU laws and norms in
return for access to EU decision-making and resources, without coercion.62 Modern history has
witnessed numerous attempts to overcome the legacy of war through agreements on certain
universal principles of morality and government, but none before European integration
succeeded in this regard. Six decades have passed without a war among the integrated states of
Europe. This is an unprecedented amount of time in the history of the continent. The EU won a
Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for its historic role in “promoting reconciliation and peace.”63
Because of the centrality of peace and cooperation to the concept of the EU, it is in the interests
of member states to act in good will and help individual refugees.
Thus, France and Germany’s individual histories and their centrality to European
integration, in addition to the EU’s symbol as a peaceful institution form mutually reinforcing
factors that give them a stake in the refugee crisis and motivate them to sign onto conventions
that help people to whom they have no obligation. The following section will study the
international refugee conventions that both countries are signatories of and analyze their impacts
on the countries’ national laws. The section is aimed towards understanding the commitments
that both France and Germany face at the international level, in order to understand the Level I
game and negotiating strategies in the countries.

61

Ibid, 8.
Ibid, 12.
63
Ibid, 7-8.
62

31

III. INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS:
The preceding chapter contextualized French, German and European historical
experiences within the larger refugee narrative. This chapter will analyze the international
commitments facing France and Germany through a discussion of the international refugee
regime and its influences on national refugee laws in both countries. Since France and Germany
operate within accepted international norms, as well as European Union (EU) standards, it is
important to understand the United Nations (UN) and EU laws before studying their laws. As
evidenced at the end of the chapter, French and German law are severely limited by the limits
and framework set forth by the UN and EU laws, and therefore resemble each other.
International Laws Concerning Refugees:
Grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of human rights 1948,64 the United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, is the centerpiece of
international refugee protection. Article 1 of the Convention defines a refugee as “someone who
is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion.” The 1951 Convention entered force on April 22, 1954 and has been subject to
only one amendment – the 1967 Protocol in New York – which removed its geographic and
temporal limits and broadened the coverage. To date, there are 147 State Parties to one or both
instruments.65
The fundamental principles of non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement
characterize the spirit of the Convention. Under these principles, Convention provisions are to be
applied without discrimination as to race, religion, country of origin, sex, age, disability,
64
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sexuality, or other prohibited grounds of discrimination; subject to specific exceptions, refugees
should not be penalized for their illegal entry or stay, thereby recognizing that seeking asylum
can require them to breach immigration rules; and refugees are provided safeguards against
involuntary expulsion in any manner whatsoever to a territory where he or she fears threats to
life or freedom. Finally, the Convention lays down minimum standards for the treatment of
refugees, without prejudice to States granting more favorable treatment. These rights include
access to the courts, to primary education, to work, and the provision for documentation,
including a refugee travel document in passport form.66_67
The Convention, however, does not apply to everyone who might otherwise satisfy the
definition of “refugee” under Article 1. These exceptions include people (a) for whom there are
reasons to believe that they have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, or who are
guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, (b) to those who
benefit from the protection or assistance of a United Nations agency other than the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and (c) to refugees who have a status
equivalent to nationals in their country of asylum.68
Thus, the UN Convention sets guidelines for countries that accede to it on how to respond
to asylum requests by defining the type of people that they can accept as part of the refugee
regime. While it doesn’t detail the process or the considerations that countries should take into
account while making a decision on applications, it does delimit the treatment of refugees within
the countries once the contracting state has reached a decision on the application. In addition to
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stipulating how states are and are not allowed to act towards refugees, the convention specifies
situations when refugees should be treated like nationals versus when they should be given the
same status as non-nationals. The procedure used when considering applications is left up to the
countries. The EU policy on refugees, however, steps into this vacuum and provides a structure
for EU countries to coordinate their asylum policies since the free flow of people within borders
calls for a common asylum policy.
European Union (EU) Policy Regarding Refugees:
Due to the focus of the EU on creating a common external border and facilitating the free
flow of people across the region, it became essential to create a unified asylum policy. While
asylum policy is still a national issue, the aim of EU asylum policy is to harmonize asylum
procedures in the Member States by establishing common asylum arrangements.69 The Common
European Asylum System (CEAS) is based on the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, as amended by the New York Protocol of January 1967 Relating to the Status of
Refugees. It is composed of several directives and regulations, which have been recast, i.e. the
consolidation of previous legislations and all the amendments made to it. It guarantees a set of
common standards and requires stronger cooperation by EU members to ensure that asylum
seekers are treated fairly and equally irrespective of where they apply.70
CEAS affirms the principle of non-refoulement that is underscored in Article 33 of the
Geneva Convention. Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
guarantees a right to asylum based on the UN Refugee Convention, and Article 19 contains a ban
on returning a person to a country where they have a well-founded fear of being persecuted, or
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face a real risk of being tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ensures the correct interpretation and application of
asylum law through the adoption of preliminary rulings, infringement proceedings against
Member States who fail to comply with obligations laid down in EU asylum law, or actions for
annulment when the legality of a provision of EU legislation is challenged. Additionally, EU
members, as members of the Council of Europe, are also bound by the Council of Europe
Treaties, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and other ratified
international agreements that may apply, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the
case of minors.71
Per the CEAS, third-country nationals who reach the EU borders, including territorial
waters and transit zones, and who wish to apply for international protection are subject to
national legislation, which must comply with EU asylum legislation. “International protection” is
defined as a request made by a third-country national or a stateless person who seeks refugee
status or subsidiary protection. Member States must guarantee the right to effectively make a
claim for international protection without obstructions or undue delay. EU Members can adopt or
retain more favorable standards as to who qualifies as a person in need of international protection
and on reception conditions, as long as they are compatible with EU rules.72 Thus, the legislation
provides Member States with the flexibility to make their own decisions on applications
received, but provides a common procedure and structure that they have to follow.
In accordance to Article 3(1) of the Dublin Regulation 603/2013, EU Member States
must examine any application for international protection lodged by a third-country national or a
stateless person, and the application must be examined by only one Member State. This
71
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regulation is binding on Member States, as well as Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Switzerland. It covers applications for international protection that were lodged as of January 1,
2014.73 This aims to reduce inefficiencies in the system by ensuring that the application review
process is not duplicated by other Member States when it is already being examined by one. The
criteria specified to determine which Member State of the EU is responsible for reviewing the
application for international protection, is applied in hierarchical order: (a) the existence of a
family in a Member State; (b) having a visa or residence permit in a Member State; and (c) entry
into a Member State, whether illegally or not. These rules are also designed to deter individuals
from abusing the system by filing applications in more than one Member State, and to avoid
national authorities sending asylum seekers from one Member State to another. If no Member
State can be designated as responsible by following the criteria, then the first Member State in
which the application for international protection was lodged must take responsibility for
examining it by default.74
The CEAS accepts the definition of a refugee as put forth in the UN Convention, but also
creates an additional category of “subsidiary protection” for people who do not qualify for
refugee status. Applications for international protection that are submitted by third-country
nationals or stateless people are governed by Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council, which establishes common standards to grant international protection to
those who qualify. The authorities must assess on a case-by-case basis whether an applicant for
international protections is a refugee, as defined by Article 1(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention,
or a person eligible for subsidiary protection. Following the definition provided in the Directive,
persecution can be committed by the state, parties or organizations controlling the state, or
73
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parties or organizations having under their control a substantial part of the territory. It may also
include non-state actors, if they cannot or are unwilling to protect victims of persecution.
Additionally, while the CEAS protects the principle of non-refoulement, it is qualified with the
exception that under certain circumstances, a person, whether formally recognized or not, may be
removed from the EU territory if they pose a threat to the security of an EU Member State, or are
deemed a threat to the host country after the commission of a crime.75
According to the Directive, the criteria that must be satisfied in order to be granted
refugee status are as follows:
1)   Face a well-founded fear of persecution.
2)   The grounds of persecution must be related to the applicant’s race, religion, nationality,
or membership in a particular social group.
3)   A causal link must exist between the well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of
one’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group and the acts of persecution.
4)   The acts of persecution may take a variety of forms, such as physical or mental violence,
including sexual violence, and, only in the case of a minor, may also include acts of a
gender-specific or child-specific nature.
Applicants who don’t qualify for refugee status but for whom there are substantial grounds to
believe that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to the country of
origin, can be granted subsidiary protection. Facing a “real risk of suffering serious harm”
includes the death penalty or execution, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
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punishment, or a serious and individualized threat to the minor due to violence in the case of
internal armed conflict.76
In line with the provisions of the UN Convention, the Directive stipulates that after
granting refugee status or subsidiary protection, Member States are required to provide
applicants with the following entitlements: residence permit, travel documents, access to
employment, education, and social welfare and healthcare. Furthermore, Directive 2011/51/EU
allows refugees and beneficiaries of international protection to be able to acquire long-term
resident status on a similar basis as other third-country nationals legally living in the EU for
more than five years. Member States were given time to comply with this Directive by 2013. The
UK, Ireland and Denmark did not take part in its application, and therefore, are not bound by it.
After five years, those applicants accorded long-term status will be able to enjoy freedom of
movement within the EU and the right to become a resident in another Member State. Under
certain conditions, they will also enjoy equality of treatment with citizens of the EU Member
State in which they reside, in a wide range of economic and social matters. These include
education, access to the labor market, and social security benefits.77
During 2015, the EU sought to ensure a coordinated European response to the refugee
crisis. Various EU agencies provided assistance, financing, training, and experts to the Member
States to implement CEAS. The European Commission also allocated over €10 billion to address
the refugee crisis and assist Member States, particularly those most impacted. To prevent the
collapse of the Schengen system of passport-free travel throughout Europe due to temporary
border controls by individual countries, and to ensure better security of its external borders, the
EU proposed the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard; they would have new powers
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and shared responsibility for the EU borders along with Member States. In November 2015, the
Commission signed an Action Plan with Turkey designed to reduce the migration flow entering
the EU through Greece.78
Therefore, the EU asylum policies are aimed to create a mechanism for coordinated
response to refugees and asylum applications. It sets guidelines to ensure that resources are
maximally utilized with no duplication of efforts, and that asylum applications and consequently
those who are awarded refugee and subsidiary protection are treated uniformly across countries.
It builds off the UN Convention, using the framework provided by it to create EU-specific
guidelines that take into account the consequences of European integration. In light of the recent
refugee crisis, the EU increased resources allocated to the functioning of the European refugee
regime that aimed to increase aid to institutions overseeing the application process, and
cooperated with neighboring countries to decrease the refugee pressure on the region.
German Refugee & Asylum Law:
German asylum law makes a distinction between political refugees, refugees and those
awarded with subsidiary protection. The right to asylum is a constitutional right in Germany,
codified in Article 16a of the German Basic Law, and is granted to everyone who flees political
persecution by the state. Political persecution is defined as “persecution that causes specific
violations of individual rights and, due to its intensity, excludes the individual from the ‘general
peace framework of the state unit.’” The constitutional right to asylum protects human dignity
and reflects the view that no state has the right to persecute an individual for his or her political
or religious beliefs or other personal characteristics that mark him or her as different. Not every
disadvantage or material hardship supports a right to asylum. Unlike the broader definition of
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perpetrators of persecution set forth in the EU legislation, only persecution that is perpetrated by
the state is relevant in German law in determining political asylum.79
However, the definition for refugees is broader. As a signatory of the 1951 Geneva
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Germany has implemented its provisions into
German law and incorporated the definition of a refugee under this Convention, into Section 3 of
the German Asylum Act, under which refugee status may be granted for humanitarian reasons.
The Asylum Act and the Residence Act are two of the most important immigration laws in
Germany that provide rules for the admission of refugees and the handling of refugee claims.
The Asylum Act codifies the process and consequences of granting and denying asylum, whereas
the Residence Act provides rules concerning the entry, stay, exit and employment of foreigners
in general. An asylum seeker is allowed to stay in Germany while he/she is seeking protection
from political persecution or seeking international protection, which includes refugee status and
subsidiary protection, or if the responsible German agency declares a deportation prohibition. If
the application is denied, the applicant has a duty to leave Germany or will be subject to
deportation proceedings.80
As discussed before, political asylum is granted under Article 16A of the German Basic
Law, while refugee status can be granted for all those reasons as well as a broad range of other
humanitarian reasons. In accordance with the EU directives, applicants who are awarded either
political asylum or refugee status receive a three-year residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis),
after which a settlement permit (Niederlassungserlaubnis) with no time limit is issued if the
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) does not object.81
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Subsidiary protection is codified in Section 4, Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Act and is
awarded to applicants who can prove that they are threatened with serious harm in their country
of origin. In accordance with CEAS, “serious harm”’ is defined as the “imposition or application
of capital punishment, torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment, or a serious
individual threat to the life or integrity of a civilian as a result of indiscriminate violence in an
international or internal armed conflict.” Applicants who are awarded with subsidiary protection
are initially granted a residence permit for one year, which can be extended for two additional
years. Moreover, the government may not deport the applicant if there is a prohibition against
deportation according to Section 60, Paragraphs 5 or 7 of the Residence Act. Deportation is
prohibited according to Paragraph 5 if it is inadmissible under the terms of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR).82
Applicants may not be deported to a country in which he/she faces a substantial and concrete
danger to his or her life, limb or liberty. Asylum seekers often invoke this provision when there
is a risk of a substantial deterioration of health after the return to their country of origin.83
A refugee can either register as an asylum-seeker at the border or from inside the country.
The authorities then direct him/her to the closest reception facility, where the staff issue a
certification of registration as an asylum seeker that includes personal details and a photo. The
authorities then determine which German state is responsible for processing the asylum
application. If the reception center in which the asylum seeker is registered is not the one that is
responsible for handling his/her case, the seeker must travel to the responsible center. Asylum
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seekers who enter Germany from safe third countries have no right to asylum and are removed to
the country they came from. The safe third countries include other EU countries, Norway and
Switzerland.84
At certain airports that have the capacity, asylum seekers who enter by air are subject to
the “airport procedure.” If the asylum seeker entered without proper papers or with false or
expired papers, or via a safe country of origin, the asylum procedure is carried out directly in the
airport transit area. Safe countries of origin are all EU countries, Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Ghana, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Senegal, and Serbia. While the
application is pending, the asylum seeker must stay in the airport transit area and cannot enter
Germany. The BAMF must decide within two days whether the asylum application is justified or
not. If the application is denied, the applicant will be denied entry into Germany and threatened
with deportation if he/she enters Germany illegally. The applicant has the right to an attorney and
can appeal the decision within three days. A judge will issue a ruling in an emergency
proceeding within fourteen days.85
In order to determine whether a person is entitled to refugee status, an in-person
interview is conducted and country-specific resources and experts are consulted. Every applicant
over the age of fourteen must submit to measures establishing his/her identity and provide
fingerprints, which are cross-checked with national and European databases and the Visa
Information System. Refugees are generally housed in reception facilities, which provide them
with essential items like food, housing, heat, clothing, health care, and household items in kind
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or in the form of vouchers, whereas persons who are housed outside of reception facilities
primarily receive cash allowances to purchase essential items.86
While an asylum application is pending, applicants are not allowed to leave the area of
the reception facility without permission. If a refugee has no independent means of subsistence, a
residence permit may also be restricted territorially. Article 34 of the 1951 UN Convention on
Refugees mandates that Contracting States must “make every effort to expedite naturalization
proceedings.” The Federal Ministry of the Interior has interpreted this provision to mean that a
period of six years of legal residence in Germany is sufficient for recognized refugees to gain
citizenship, instead of the regular eight-years stipulation for a foreigner. Additionally, the
Federal Administrative Court has concluded that due to the existence of Article 34 and the fact
that German Basic Law awards asylum seekers special protection, discretionary naturalization is
the appropriate naturalization category since the naturalization process for refugees is in public
interest.87_88
Several amendments to current laws have been adopted in recent months due to the
refugee crisis. On October 24, 2015, the Act on the Acceleration of Asylum Procedures entered
force. The Act amended several laws, thereby accelerating the asylum process, substituting inkind benefits for cash benefits, reducing the financial burden on the German states and
municipalities, reforming integration policies for refugees, and designating Albania, Kosovo, and
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Montenegro as safe countries of origin.89 This amendment will allow authorities to function
efficiently in the face of increasing applications, by reallocating more resources and labor to
them and introducing stricter laws regarding safe countries of origin.
The Bundestag also instituted acts that would improve the quality of life for not only the
awardee of international protection, but also for the German people. On November 1, 2015, the
Act to Improve the Housing, Care, and Treatment of Foreign Minors and Adolescents entered
into force in order to improve the situation of young unaccompanied refugees and provide them
with appropriate care. On August 1, 2015, the Act to Redefine the Right to Stay and the
Termination of Residence entered effect. It amended the Residence Act by ordering a ban on
entry and residence for applicants from safe countries of residence and in case of repeat followup applications. Additionally, the Act grants a residence permit to persons who can prove that
they are well-integrated after a period of eight years and to well-integrated minors after four
years.90
Lastly, on February 3, 2016, the German government agreed on a set of stricter asylum
measures, labeled “Asylum Package II,” which was passed in the German Bundestag in early
2016.91 This set of regulations will accelerate the asylum application process; suspend family
reunification for refugees with subsidiary protection status for a period of 2 years; decrease
asylum seeker’s monthly cash benefits; facilitate deportation; establish a new Federal Police unit
to help procure replacement documents; improve safety of refugee minors; and designate
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as safe countries of origin.92

89

Ibid.
Ibid.
91
News, “German cabinet approves asylum legislation package,” DW, February 3, 2016, last accessed on
April 16, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/german-cabinet-approves-asylum-legislation-package/a19021974.
92
“Refugee Law and Policy: Germany.”
90

44

Germany asylum law therefore follows the structure laid out by the UN Convention and
the EU policies to determine the different categories of international protection that should be
offered by the country, the type of asylum seekers who qualify, and the benefits that are offered
for each. Recent changes to asylum law is not only aimed at decreasing the workload of the
overseeing agencies in light of the refugee crisis, but also aims to improve quality of life for the
successful asylum seekers and the German population by focusing on their integration into
society and the provision of stricter law and order in the country. A stronger law and order body
will help lessen discord and increase trust in society, thereby leading to greater harmony.
French Refugee & Asylum Law:
France has a long tradition of offering asylum to foreign refugees. One of the
constitutions drafted during the French revolution - the Constitution of 1793 – provided that
France should “give asylum to foreigners who have been banished from their homeland for the
cause of liberty,” and should “refuse [asylum] to tyrants.” While the Constitution of 1793 was
never actually implemented, French asylum law today gains authority from the preamble to the
French Constitution of 1946, which was incorporated into the current constitution by reference.
It declares that “[a]ny man persecuted in virtue of his actions in favor of liberty may claim the
right of asylum upon the territories of the Republic.” In 1993, the Constitutional Council, the
French high court with jurisdiction over questions of constitutionality, confirmed that asylum is a
constitutional right for persons who qualify for it, based on this constitutional provision.
Consequently, it ruled that asylum applicants have a general right to stay in France until a
decision has been reached on their asylum request, and that barring any threat to public order, all
persons who qualify for asylum must be allowed to stay in France.93
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French asylum law has mostly been codified in the Code of Entry and Residence of
Foreigners and of the Right of Asylum (CESEDA), and is influenced by international and
European law. Of particular importance are the UN Convention, and the EU Regulation of June
26, 2013, i.e. the Dublin Regulation.94 The French asylum law has undergone many changes,
especially in response to the challenges posed by the current refugee crisis.95 In particular,
French legislators enacted a law in July 2015 that reformed several aspects of asylum law to
ensure that all those eligible for asylum receive a more dignified response through lower
application processing times and a directed housing system. The bill also made the removal of
rejected asylum seekers a priority.96 This section describes French asylum law as it currently
stands after the implementation of this 2015 law.97
There are two basic types of asylum protection in France, that of the refugee status and
subsidiary protection. Refugee status is assigned to “any person persecuted for his/her action in
favor of liberty,” as well as any person over whom the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) has competence under Articles 6 and 7 of its statute, and any person who is
covered by Article 1 of the UN Convention. To the criteria for persecution listed in the
Convention, French law adds gender and sexual orientation as factors to consider as well. The
persecution feared by the asylum seeker does not necessarily have to come from his/her
country’s government, but can also be at the hands of a non-state actor, if the country’s
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government is unable or unwilling to protect the asylum seeker. A person may be denied refugee
status, or such status may be revoked, if (a) there is serious reason to believe that his/her
presence in France presents a grave threat to the security of the state; or (b) he/she was found
guilty of an act of terrorism or of a crime punished by more than ten years of incarceration, and
his/her presence in France presents a grave threat to the society.98
In accordance with the CEAS, France offers subsidiary protection in addition to refugee
protection. Subsidiary protection is given to any person who does not fulfill the conditions to be
recognized as a refugee, but for whom there are serious and known reasons to believe that he/she
is in real danger of suffering the following violations in his/her country: (a) execution, (b) torture
or inhumane or degrading treatment, or (c) if the person is a civilian, a serious and individual
threat to his/her life or person by reasons of indiscriminate violence in situations of international
or internal armed conflict. As with refugees, protection can be denied, however the criteria are
different. Subsidiary protection may be denied to a person when there are serious reasons to
believe that (a) he/she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity; (b) he/she has committed a serious crime; (c) he/she is guilty of acts contrary to the
objectives and principles of the United Nations; or (d) his/her activity on French territory
presents a grave threat to public order, public security, or the security of the state. Additionally,
protection may be denied if there is credible reason to believe that he/she has committed a crime
that would be punishable by prison had it been committed in France, and that he/she only left
his/her country of origin to escape punishment for that crime.99
Refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have the right to live and work in
France, and to bring their spouse and children. Following the spirit of the European directives,
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those granted refugee status can apply for naturalization immediately. Both refugees and
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have the right to obtain travel documents from the French
government, and have similar rights to social benefits as French citizens do, but only have access
to certain special aid programs during the time that their application for asylum is being
processed. They are also required to attend some civic training programs and, if necessary,
language classes, to help with assimilation.100
Applicants for asylum must be either on French territory or at a French border crossing
point to request asylum. Asylum seekers may also request a special visa for the purpose of
asylum from a French embassy or consulate before coming to France. Those with the visa must
follow the same procedure as other asylum seekers once in France, but are authorized to work
while his/her application for asylum is being processed and evaluated, unlike other applicants
who are kept in a “waiting zone” for a few days while the Ministry of Interior decides whether
they should be allowed inside the country or not.101
Once allowed into France, asylum seekers must register at a local prefecture that verifies
whether France would be responsible for protecting the asylum seeker under European Union
rules. If no other country is found to be responsible for protecting the asylum seeker under the
Dublin Regulation, the prefectural services give the applicant a document certifying that he/she
is registered as an asylum seeker, as well as information on the application process, the
applicant’s rights and obligations, assistance that he/she is entitled to, and any local
organizations that help asylum seekers. The next steps of the application process include sending
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the application to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons
(OFPRA), which determines who is eligible for refugee status or subsidiary protection.102
The OFPRA must reach a decision within six months, though in certain situations it may
take longer. They evaluate all relevant evidence, and usually conduct an interview of the
applicant as part of its investigation. The OFPRA’s decisions may be appealed to the National
Court for Asylum Law (CNDA) within one month of being notified of the decision. They may
either (a) deny the applicant’s appeal, (b) reverse the OFPRA’s decision and grant asylum to the
applicant, or (c) quash the OFPRA’s decision and send the case back to it for further
investigation.103 In short, like Germany, stipulations from the UN Convention, as well as the
CEAS provide the basis for the way that France organizes its asylum categories, carries out
administration and review of asylum applications, and approaches assimilation.
To conclude, France and Germany have similar asylum laws in their countries, especially
in terms of their definitions of those who qualify as refugees and receivers of subsidiary
protection, their application decision process, and the benefits that they provide to recipients of
international protection. This is a logical outcome given that both laws are centered on the
framework provided by the UN Convention and the CEAS. However, based on data collected on
the number of refugees in the countries and the number of asylum applications that were
received every year, it is evident that both countries differ in their response to the refugee crisis
despite similar commitments at the international level. Since the actual number of refugees
present in the country is a measure of the policy stance of the government, the next chapter
delves deeper into the reasons for these differences through a regression that uses Putnam’s twolevel game theory as its basis.
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IV. THE REGRESSION:
The previous chapter illustrated that France and Germany face the same international
commitments regarding refugees that resulted in similar laws being implemented in both
countries. However, their refugee trends and situations differ. Since this is a result of government
implementation of laws that are already in place, and government implementation is a result of
the negotiation of international pressures with domestic sentiment, this chapter will analyze
certain measures of the two-level game in both the countries. In order to do so, I will run
regressions that include three measures of domestic variables, which capture public sentiment on
foreigners and refugees and the generosity of the government in providing social welfare, and
two measures of international pressures that are related to the refugee crisis. A discussion of the
results, focused on explaining the differences in the refugee situation in France and Germany,
will follow the regression.
Methodological Considerations:
This section will analyze the refugee situation in France and Germany from 1990 to 2016
using separate time series regressions that will give an insight into the two-level games in the
two countries, and a panel data regression that will use data from both countries observed across
the given time-period to produce a combined result. The rationale behind this course of action is
that the results from the time series regression will help shed more light about the panel data
results. The time series regression is a sequence of the dependent and independent variables
indexed by time, while a panel data combines the data from both countries and sequences their
dependent and independent variables by time, thus revealing more about the interaction between
the two games in both the countries.
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The dependent variable is the scaled refugee population in the two countries to the total
population, and the independent variables include measures of domestic and international
pressures on the governments of the two countries. The following is the final list of independent
variables in the regression: a linear time trend (year) that accounts for the change in the
proportion of refugees due to the passage of time holding all other factors fixed,104 the proportion
of votes that anti-immigrant parties received in the federal elections (fed_votes), the proportion
of total seats that anti-immigrant parties received in regional elections across the country
(reg_seats),105 the amount of government spending on the social safety net as a percentage of
GDP (govt_ssn), the number of asylum applications received by the country scaled to the total
world flow of refugees during that year (asy_flow), and the voter turnout in the country for EU
elections expressed in percentage terms (eu_turnout). The summary statistics and correlation
matrix for the variables are included in the Appendix.
The time series regression for both countries takes the following form:
ref_popt = ß0 + ß1 yeart + ß2 fed_votest + ß3 reg_seatst + ß4 govt_ssnt + ß5 asy_flowt +
ß6 eu_turnoutt + ut,
where t refers to the year-specific entry for the variable, and ut is the error term in time-period t
that represents factors that affect the scaled population of refugees in the country other than the
variables included in the regression. I ran a fixed effects panel data regression, that controls for
omitted variables that differ between the two countries but stay constant over time, after running
a Hausman test. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the
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efficient random effects estimator are the same as the coefficients estimated by the consistent
fixed effects estimator. If the Pr(Chi2) is larger than 0.05, then we fail to reject the null
hypothesis that both these coefficients are the same, and it doesn’t matter which regression is
used. 106 However, my Pr(Chi2) was less than 0.05, and therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis
and used the fixed effects regression. The equation for the panel data was:
ref_popit = ß1 yearit + ß2 fed_votesit + ß3 reg_seatsit + ß4 govt_ssnit + ß5 asy_flowit +
ß6 eu_turnoutit +ai + uit,
where i is equal to 1 for France and 2 for Germany, ai is the country-specific intercept, and uit is
the error term for country i in year t.
The Indicators and their Significance:
Voting Dynamics:
The percentage of votes that anti-immigrant parties received at the federal level and the
proportion of seats that they won at the state level aim to measure public sentiments in France
and Germany regarding refugees and foreigners. The theoretical foundation for using the two
variables stems from the notion that political institutions are responsive to citizens’
preferences.107 In representative democracies, it is the responsibility of the government officials
to carry out the desires of their constituents; those who wish to remain in office must consider
the views of those who elected them and therefore, must pay attention to the trends in public
opinion. One way of determining views of those that they represent is to study the election of
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office-holders. While many considerations factor into the vote decision, candidates who are
successful in their bids for office can surmise with some confidence that their constituents
support their positions.108 Therefore, the popularity of anti-immigrant parties in elections gives
us an insight into the temperament of the citizens and to some extent, informs us of the trends we
can expect government decisions to follow.
Despite the fact that refugee laws are national decisions and not state decisions,109_110 it is
still important to look at the power of anti-immigrant parties at the state level since they provide
more accurate information about public sentiment on issues as they are closer to the ground.
Parties competing at the state level are “responsive to local needs…[and] indeed, the local level
is often where issues that subsequently become national policy first appear.” Not only do they
provide better information about the prevailing mood on the ground, but it is common for
candidates who run for the higher offices to start their careers from the regional organizations of
their party. Hence, if successful, these candidates can help determine the policy direction of the
party, thereby leading to what was earlier a regional phenomenon, influencing national politics.
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While both are representative democracies, Germany and France have differing electoral
systems. In its federal elections to the Bundestag that are held every four years, Germany uses a
personalized proportional voting system with two votes: the first vote is for a direct candidate in
a district and the second vote is for a party. There are 299 electoral districts, and a party must
receive at least 5 percent of the second votes or three direct mandates to be represented in the
Bundestag. 112 In my regression, I looked at the second votes received by anti-immigrant parties
because they were the votes that were cast in support of the party and its platform. Additionally,
I included the federal vote share instead of the seat share because the 5 percent obstacle would
have led to biased numbers in Germany if I had looked at the latter. In fact, for the time-period in
question, anti-immigrant parties did not hold any seats in the Bundestag. In 2013, the election
law in the country was amended to remedy the problem of overhang seats that occurred when a
party’s first votes exceeded the proportion of seats that they would have been allocated on the
basis of their second votes. According to the current law, if a situation of overhang seats now
occurs, to ensure that each party receives seats proportionate to its share at the federal level,
additional balance seats are awarded.113 At the state level, elections are conducted in the 16
German states under various rules set by the states themselves, and the dates of elections vary
from state to state. While searching for data on the results of the different state elections, I found
that the election period was generally four to five years.
I collected data from four political parties in Germany whose stance against foreign
immigrants and refugees comprised a big part of their party platform: National Democratic Party
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(NPD), German People’s Union (DVU), The Republicans (REP) and Alternative for Germany
(AfD). The NPD, which is Germany’s oldest national party that has been in existence since 1945,
is one of the few patriotic organizations not yet banned by the government.114 The party platform
is opposed to migrants and asylum-seekers and incites Islamophobia, in particular, amongst its
supporters.115 The DVU’s appeal was to those Germans, “particularly young, male, rural, less
educated, blue-collar workers who fear[ed] for their economic future and regard[ed] the large
pool of asylum-seekers as competitors for housing, social programs, and jobs.”116 In 2010, the
NPD and DVU attempted to merge, but a legal challenge by a group of state-level DVU
organizations successfully blocked the move.117 In similar vein, The Republicans call for
restrictions on foreign residents and an end to immigration, among other demands. In the late
20th century, the rightist REP and DVU were the most visible of Germany’s fringe parties, but
had been unsuccessful in surmounting the 5 percent barrier at national elections due to their tiny
memberships.118 The AfD is a new force in German politics, and is “first and foremost an antiimmigration party…[whose] successes in local elections last year has been largely put down to
public anger over Angela Merkel’s welcoming policy towards refugees.” The party emphasizes
the primacy of German language and traditional German culture, and rejects the idea that Islam
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is a part of German society.119 While none of the parties received any seats in the national
parliament, they have experienced several successes in certain states over the years.120_121_122
For France, 577 representatives or deputies are elected to the legislative body by direct
universal suffrage for five-year terms through a two-round voting system. They are elected to
discrete, single-seat legislative districts, and the number of legislative districts in each
département, which is the main administrative subdivision of French territory, varies according
to the census population. French citizens residing abroad are also represented in the Parliament
by eleven deputies.123 I included the data from the first-round votes in my regression since they
provide a more accurate representation of anti-immigrant public opinion, when voters are faced
with the full set of alternate candidate choices.
At the start of 2016, the number of regions in metropolitan France – which is continental
France including the island of Corsica – decreased from 22 to 13 regions, resulting in a total of
18 French regions: 13 in European France and 5 overseas regions. Each region has its regional
council, which is presided by a regional president and includes a local administration too.124 The
members of the council depend on the population of the region and are elected approximately
every five years. Regional councils are responsible for local affairs, including economic
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development, transportation, public education, sustainable development and planning, urban
zoning and land management, and support of small and medium-sized businesses. They also
share responsibility for tourism, culture and sports with internal departments in the region. The
elections are conducted in two rounds like the legislative elections; any list/party exceeding 50
percent of the votes in the first round will be declared the winner and is automatically allocated
25 percent of the seats, with the remaining 75 percent of the seats divided amongst lists who
received at least 5 percent of the votes. If no list/party reaches 50 percent of the votes, then those
who obtained at least 10 percent will be included in the second-round elections, and the seats
will be allocated amongst the winners in the same way as in the first round. List/parties that won
at least 5-10 percent of the votes in the first round can merge and form a new list/party in the
second round.125
The most prominent anti-immigration political party in France is the National Front (FN),
whose party platform is associated with French nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and a
call for control on immigration. In its first decade of existence, FN dwelt on the fringes of French
political life. However, it has grown in popularity since the 1990s. In 1995, Jean-Marie Le Pen,
the leader of the National Front from 1972 to 2011, captured more than 15 percent of the vote in
the presidential elections, and the party had major successes in mayoral elections in several
regions. In 2011, Marine Le Pen assumed leadership from her father and distanced herself from
the extreme views that had been traditionally associated with her father and FN. However, she
continued to present immigration, particularly from Islamic countries, as a threat to France.126
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In recent years, FN has witnessed major strides in regional and national-level elections.
In the 2012 presidential elections, Le Pen finished third behind Nicolas Sarkozy and François
Hollande, winning 18 percent of the vote. However, she did not earn a place in the second-round
elections. In May 2014, the party rode a wave of Euroskepticism127 and finished first in elections
for the European Parliament by capturing approximately one-fourth of the votes. In the
December 2015 regional elections, FN performed well in the first round, but lost the regional
presidencies because the Socialist Party strategically withdrew poorly polling candidates ahead
of the second round to ensure that anti-FN votes were not split.128 While collecting data, I created
three separate variables for anti-immigrant parties in France based on different definitions of
“anti-immigrant”: the first solely included National Front data, the second definition was slightly
broader and included the category of “Miscellaneous Extreme Right-wing (DivED),” and the
third definition was the broadest and contained numbers from “Miscellaneous Right-wing
(DivD)” victories too. However, there were no significant changes in the results from the
regression by using different definitions. Thus, I only included the narrowest definition of “antiimmigrant” in my regressions, i.e. only FN data.129_130_131
Government Spending:
The third variable included in the regression to measure domestic temperament is
government spending on the social safety net to determine the generosity of the country.
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Compared to the United States, European social programs are more generous and reach a larger
share of citizens.132 Literature on the relationship of welfare institutions and migration suggests
that there should be a negative correlation between this variable and the number of refugees in
each of the countries due to competition between citizens with immigrants for scarce resources,
exacerbated by a sense of conflict that is motivated by perceived differences in race, religion and
ethnicity.133 However, a study of the forced migration patterns in seventeen Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries between 1980 and 2003 suggests
that “comprehensive welfare state institutions [positively] correlate with the solidaristic act of
accepting forced migrants.” These results can be understood using the theoretical framework that
institutions shape and influence norms, values and trust in the society. The study argues that
comprehensive welfare state institutions are beneficial for social solidarity since they lessen
conflicts over redistribution of resources by reducing the separation between the “‘us’ (the
taxpayers) and ‘them’ (the receivers of welfare, the poor).” Consequently, welfare institutions
promote a generalized trust by promoting a sense of shared fate in society and reducing
inequality, and illustrate that the state is willing and able to commit and implement heavy tasks
that are related to social solidarity. Thus, the study concludes, welfare institutions promote the
view that “the state both should and can ‘administer solidarity’ on a large-scale basis,” thereby
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increasing likelihood of welfare states in implementing less restrictive policies regarding forced
migrants – asylum seekers and refugees.134
I collected data on government spending from the OECD website135 and summed
government spending on Housing and Community Amenities, Health, Education and Social
Protection to derive numbers on the social safety net spending in both France and Germany from
1995-2015, as a percentage of the respective country’s GDP. Analysis of the data suggests that
France is more generous with its social programs than is Germany, with its social safety net
ranging from 34 to 40 percent of the GDP, compared to the mere 30 to 33 percent in Germany.
However, both countries experienced increasing trends in government spending on welfare and
social safety nets over the 20 years that the data spanned.
International Pressures:
The remaining two variables in the regression relate to international pressures on the
governments of France and Germany. The proportion of the total flow of refugees that the
country received in the form of asylum applications is illustrative of the pressure on the
government to fulfil their international obligation as signatories of two international refugee
conventions. I used the asylum application and total population data from Chapter 1 to create this
variable. The second variable measures voter participation in the two countries for European
Union (EU) Parliament elections. The rationale behind including this variable is that if voter
participation is high in the two countries, then the French and German people care about their
involvement in the EU, which will make them more likely to meet their international obligations.
Voter turnout data suggests that voter turnout is higher in Germany, ranging from 43 percent to
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62 percent. In the 1990s, voter participation was at a high of 62 percent and kept decreasing until
the 2004 EU elections where it hit an all-time low of 43 percent. In the 2014 elections, voter
participation increased to 48 percent. In France, turnout ranged from 41 percent to 53 percent. In
the 1994 elections, voter turnout peaked at 53 percent, and then kept falling until the 2014 EU
elections when it rose to 42 percent.136
Analysis of the Regression Results:
The following section will discuss the results from both time series regressions and the
panel data regression.
Dependent variable:
Refugee share in total population
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
year
fed_votes
reg_seats
govt_ssn
asy_flow
eu_turnout
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
France
ref_pop

(2)
Germany
ref_pop

(3)
Panel
ref_pop

0.00004
(0.00003)
0.00115
(0.00114)
-0.00182
(0.00287)
0.02382***
(0.00503)
-0.06096
(0.06769)
0.00604**
(0.00278)
-0.00914***
(0.00161)

-0.00049***
(0.00005)
-0.12935***
(0.02248)
-0.00608
(0.03970)
-0.00328
(0.01967)
0.43567***
(0.11085)
-0.00617
(0.00418)
0.02206**
(0.00751)

-0.00042***
(0.00007)
-0.00935
(0.00768)
-0.03316*
(0.01681)
0.07496***
(0.02058)
0.04089
(0.11991)
-0.00057
(0.00660)
-0.00466
(0.00925)

20

20

0.93847

0.97975

40
2
0.81266

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1. Time Series and Panel Data Regression Results for France and Germany
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The time series regression from France yielded government spending on the social safety
net and the voter turnout in EU elections as practical variables in predicting the refugee
population in France relative to the total population.137 Congruent with the study on the impact of
welfare state institutions on government decisions with regards to forced migration, government
spending is positively related to the refugee population in France in this regression. The variable
is significant at the 1 percent significance level and states that when government spending on
social welfare increases by 1 percent of the GDP, the refugee population will increase by 2.4
percent of the total population. Thus, welfare state institutions can be viewed as a political
commitment to “protect the well-being of individuals…[and] the strength of this commitment
depends on…the generosity of the welfare state.”138
Additionally, voter turnout in France during the EU Parliament elections is also
significant, but at the 5 percent significance level, and implies that a 1 percent increase in voter
turnout increases refugee population by 0.6 percent of the French population. This is also in line
with our previous hypothesis since higher participation in EU elections can be used as a measure
of greater concern for the country’s international involvements. A joint significance test for both
the domestic election variables failed to yield a significant p-value, leading to the conclusion that
the population value of the domestic election variables jointly is equal to zero, or is insignificant.
Hence, our measure of domestic public opinion failed to lead to conclusive evidence in France.
For Germany, the linear time trend, federal vote share of anti-immigrant parties and the
scaled asylum applications yielded significant coefficients.139 The linear time trend is negatively
correlated to the dependent variable, implying that with each successive year, the number of
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refugees fell by 0.05 percent of the total population. This phenomenon can be attributed to the
Balkan refugees who were leaving Germany throughout the 1990s, and whose effects can still be
felt today as evidenced in the graph explaining the current refugee situation in Germany in
Chapter 1. Similarly, the positive coefficient of the scaled asylum applications on the proportion
of refugees in the country can be explained by the two peaks in the number of asylum
applications received by Germany and the subsequent increases in the refugee population, also
seen in the first chapter.
The federal vote variable in the time series regression states that as votes for the German
anti-immigrant parties increases by 1 percent, the refugee population decreases by 12.9 percent
of the total population. The significance of the federal level elections over the regional elections
is logical given that refugee and immigration law is a federal issue in Germany due to the
distribution of power between the federal and state governments. Thus, even though no antiimmigrant party has held any seats in the federal level government during the time-period in
question, having failed to clear the 5 percent hurdle, support for them still influences decision
making as incumbent parties have an interest in remaining in office. This is witnessed in Angela
Merkel’s recent shift to the right, the most recent of which has been support for the ban of fullface veils. Other examples include increased border patrol, decreased social benefits for
refugees, deported asylum seekers and a deal with Turkey to stem the flow of refugees arriving
in Europe.140
The fixed effects panel data regression resulted in significant coefficients for the linear
time trend and government spending on the social safety net at the 1 percent significance level.
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The proportion of seats held by anti-immigrant parties for both countries was significant at the
10 percent level; this is a marked change from the time series regressions because this variable
wasn’t significant in either of the previous individual regressions. The time trend in the panel
data regression has a negative coefficient and suggests that with the passage of time, the
proportion of refugees in France and Germany will decrease by 0.04 percent of the total
population on average. Since the time trend in the French time series regression was positively
correlated to the dependent variable, it can be surmised that the time trend in the panel data is
influenced more strongly by Germany’s data.
The panel data variable measuring government spending is positively correlated to the
proportion of refugees in both the countries and implies that an increase of government spending
by 1 percent of the GDP, leads to an increase in the proportion of refugees by 7.49 percent of the
total population in both countries on average. Again, this result is influenced more by one
country than the other: the government spending variable in Germany was negative while it was
positive for France, and therefore, suggests that the French data overpowered German data in the
regression. While some can argue that the negative correlation of the variable in Germany
disproves the theory that welfare states are more generous to refugees than non-welfare states,
the variable’s coefficient in Germany is not significant, meaning that there is a less than 90
percent chance that the true population value of the coefficient is not equal to zero. Thus, no
conclusions should be drawn based on this result.
The significance of the regional elections at the 10 percent level in this regression raises
questions since it did not show any tendencies for significance in previous regressions. My
conjecture is that when the data for both countries was aggregated, public opinion trends in the
voting patterns at the regional levels showed more correlation with the level of refugees in the
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countries, since it is closer to the ground. In addition to the significance of the proportion of
regional seats held by anti-immigrant parties, a joint F-test for both the domestic elections
variables produced a F-statistic of 4.16. A F-statistic of this magnitude means that the null
hypothesis that the two variables are jointly insignificant, can be rejected, and therefore, we can
conclude that the two variables are important in determining the level of refugees in the countries
relative to the total population. The coefficients of the two variables are negative, which is in line
with the expectations put forth earlier in the chapter.
In summary, at the country-specific level, the time series regressions suggest that a
combination of domestic considerations and international pressures influence the refugee levels
in both countries. In France, the welfare state institution and people’s commitment to the
country’s international involvement seem to play a greater role, while in Germany, the time
trend, public opinion at the federal level and the proportion of asylum seekers headed towards
Germany were influential. The results of the panel data regression add a layer of depth to these
results and yield significant results for the measures of domestic pressure that I included in the
regressions. Thus, I conclude that the differences in domestic pressures between France and
Germany play an important role in explaining why their current refugee realities are different.
The next chapter will apply these findings to understand why the German public is currently
more welcoming towards refugees than the French, and will discuss the implications of the
trends suggested by the data for the future of the two countries and the EU.
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V. CONCLUSION:
This study sought to analyze the domestic and international pressures faced by the French
and German governments to better understand the policies pursued by them with regards to
refugees. In order to do so, Chapter 1 discussed Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory that
formed the foundation of my analysis, and explored the current refugee situation and pressures
faced by France and Germany. Chapter 2 illustrated that both countries had incentives to take on
a leadership role in the current refugee crisis due to their unique historical experiences and the
central role that they played in the peaceful enterprise of European integration. Chapter 3
examined the constraints placed on France and Germany by way of their international
commitments to refugees, and theorized that since the pressures facing them were similar but
their responses were not, the two countries must differ in their approach because of differences at
the domestic level. Chapter 4 tested the hypothesis by conducting individual time series
regressions, as well as a panel data regression. Since this paper was motivated by the Refugee
Welcome Index that was created by Amnesty International after a survey of 27 countries and
found that the German public was more welcoming towards refugees than the French, the current
section will now interpret the results of the regression to explain Amnesty International’s
findings. Additionally, I will explore the significance of the trends in the data and their
implications for the future.
Review of the Regression and its Main Findings:
The previous chapter concluded that domestic pressures included in the regression
exerted instrumental influence on the proportion of refugees in France and Germany relative to
the total population in the countries. This result sheds light on why the refugee situations in the
two countries differ despite facing similar pressures at the international level. The variables in
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my regression aimed to capture public sentiment, government structure and the influence of the
unique histories of the two countries: the election variables, namely the federal vote share and
regional seat share of anti-immigrant parties, attempted to capture public xenophobia, while the
voter turnout in European Union (EU) elections sought sentiment on the importance of the EU –
and therefore of the country’s commitments at the international levels by proxy. Government
generosity was measured by the spending on social safety nets, while government structure was
evidenced in the election results since they determine if anti-immigrant sentiments translate into
policy and impact the number of refugees in the country. The histories and individual
characteristics of the two countries were accounted for in the proportion of asylum seekers to the
overall world flow of refugees since decisions by asylum seekers would include a combination of
the following considerations: is there a personal and cultural connection with the country; is the
country more welcoming to foreigners and sympathetic to their plight; is the journey long,
perilous and difficult?141
At a country specific level, Germany’s time series regression revealed that public opinion
combined with government structure and personal history played an important role in
determining the country’s refugee levels: as a representative democracy, even though antiimmigrant parties failed to gain seats in the parliament – the body that is tasked with determining
refugee and asylum policy – growing support for far right parties decreased refugee levels in
conjunction with a decrease in the numbers since the end of the Balkan wars. Simultaneous with
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the decrease, Angela Merkel’s vocal welcoming of refugees led to an increase in the number of
scaled asylum applications in recent years that may explain the current increase in the refugee
levels in Germany.
Meanwhile, in France, government generosity and public opinion about French
international involvement were significant. As a bigger welfare state than Germany, government
generosity yielded a significant positive coefficient in the country’s regression, as did the turnout
for the EU Parliament elections. While it is interesting that variables measuring unique French
characteristics were not significant, historical ties and geographical connections play a role in
determining people’s perceptions about the continuing importance of the EU for their country.
The EU has responded to the refugee crisis by increasing aid to countries that have been
overwhelmed with refugees and putting its mechanisms at the disposal of the member states to
help them navigate the crisis.142 Therefore, a vote in favor of the EU is a vote in favor of its
humanitarian and civil protection response by proxy.
Relating Findings to the Refugee Welcome Index:
The regression in Chapter 4 not only helps us understand the differences in the current
pressures facing French and German governments regarding the crisis, but also sheds light on
public sentiment regarding the issue. The Refugee Welcome Index published by Amnesty
International and discussed in the Introduction informs us that there is more resistance to
refugees by the public in France than in Germany. These findings can be explained by analyzing
the domestic variables from the regression. While both countries are experiencing an increase in
support for anti-immigrant parties, as Charts 6 and 7 show,143 National Front (FN) has enjoyed a
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greater percentage of the votes at the federal level and seats at the regional level than antiimmigrant parties in Germany. This is because while both countries experienced the growth of
far-right parties as, first, a radical phenomenon and as fringe parties, FN has enjoyed greater
successes at the federal level in French politics than its German counterparts, who have been
held back by failing to individually secure the 5 percent votes necessary to gain representation in
the Bundestag.
FN’s beginnings are rooted in a protest vote that had very little grassroots presence or
local organization. Voting for it was “taboo and utterly frowned upon:” its voters found it
“inconceivable” to show their support for the party with neo-Nazi roots and anti-Semitic links
outwardly for fear of being “attacked on all sides” when they did. However, it is now a national
phenomenon, having made great strides in regional elections and securing its place as the “first
party of France” after winning a quarter of the votes in the European Parliament elections.144
Meanwhile, in Germany, memories of the rise of Adolf Hitler following national success for a
far-right party has resulted in far-right anti-immigrant parties having remained as fringe parties
in the country’s politics, which has been solidly liberal since the reunification of Germany in
1990.145 However, the country’s politics seems to be at a turning point in its history, with the
rapid rise of far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) that has accomplished in less than four
years what took other populist European parties, such as the FN in France, more than four
decades to achieve. Despite its rapid rise, the party narrowly missed the 5 percent needed to enter
the national parliament in the 2013 elections. Since no anti-immigrant party has been successful
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in securing a seat in the federal legislative body in Germany while the FN has established itself
as a major competitor to France’s traditional political parties, anti-immigrant sentiment has had
greater influence in the way it manifests in France than in Germany, both for the public and in
politics.
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Additionally, while government spending is a measure of the generosity of the
government, group conflict theory provides answers as to why citizens of France and Germany
will be opposed to letting in refugee populations even if it makes governments more welcoming
towards forced migrants. This theory advocates that when resources are perceived to be scarce,
regardless of whether they truly are, there is hostility between groups of people as they are seen
to be fighting over the same scarce resources.146 Hence, when a government provides services to
the general public, the beneficiaries of the services will not want to expand membership since the
new members would be taking a piece of the existing pie if they join. This notion has been
evidenced in refugee debates in Europe: in Germany, AfD supporters cite government support
for refugees in the form of social benefits, including free shelter, food, medical services,
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approximately €216 to cover basic needs and an additional €143 a month in pocket money, as
reasons for losing faith in Merkel’s refugee policy.147 Since France is a bigger welfare state than
Germany, it is evident that there would be more resistance in the country to refugees than in
Germany. This sentiment is strengthened by the fact that FN has been playing an active role in
the politics of the country for a longer time.
Wider Implications:
Developments in the data indicate that anti-immigrant trends in both the countries are on
the upward swing, suggesting that at some point in the future, France and Germany will no
longer be a place of refuge for forced migrants. As Charts 6 and 7 illustrated, support for antiimmigrant parties in the countries are trending up, and polls for the 2017 elections in both
countries predict further success for FN in France and AfD in Germany. In France, according to
polls, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the FN, could best her left-wing and right-wing opponents to
reach the final round of the 2017 presidential race. Her surging popularity has caused a lot of
anxiousness amongst the mainstream parties, with the current Prime Minister, Manuel Valls,
quoted as saying, “I fear for my country.”148
Even though political pundits predict that Le Pen does not have enough support to
become the President,149 her party could upset the new French president by making big gains in
the parliamentary elections due to the “odd hybrid” nature of the French political system that is a
mix between the presidential and parliamentary systems usually seen in Western democracies.
“On one hand, the president is elected by popular vote – which makes them the nation’s true
political leader. One the other hand, the prime minister selected by the president must be
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supported by a majority in parliament.” Hence, when the parliament is in opposition to the
president, “it reduces the head of state to a figurehead.” In those situations, the prime minister
holds most of the executive powers, except for the governance of foreign policy and defense,
which are part of the president’s constitutional powers.150 Through a strong showing in the
parliamentary elections, Le Pen and the FN would be able to exert strong influence on the
country’s asylum policy. Opinion polls in France predict that the Right will win between 266 and
292 seats, leaving the Left with 188-208 seats. The National Front is expected to secure between
58 and 64 seats,151 which is a lot more than the 2 seats that it currently holds in the National
Assembly.152
In Germany, several polls show AfD as the party to get the third-most votes in the
Bundestag elections after the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)
coalition and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), securing between 7 to 11 percent of the
votes.153 Consequently, the 2017 elections in both countries will be a defining moment for the
refugee crisis since predictions of strong showings for anti-immigrant parties could indicate the
beginning of the end for refugees in Europe.
In addition to growing support for FN and AfD, the demographic of the supporters for the
two parties also has important repercussions for the refugee issue. Overwhelming support for the
parties have come from the younger population. Recent polls show that Le Pen enjoys 40 percent
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support among French youths aged 18 to 24, and National Front’s youth wing has increased
membership from 10,000 to 25,000 members in the last five years. The party’s young supporters
cite disillusionment with mainstream politics, high unemployment especially amongst the youth,
massive immigration, “globalization with no borders” and lost “French grandeur” as reasons for
supporting the party. Political reporter, Oliver Beaumont, attributes this support to Le Pen’s
attempt to change the party’s image after expelling her father: “Young supporters don’t
remember the days when the National Front was widely seen as a pariah, fringe party run by
Marine Le Pen’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen…[,who] was convicted several times for hate
speech.”154
Similarly in Germany, AfD has been doing better amongst younger people than older
people who tend to stick to the centrist CDU or the SPD.155 The two biggest factions of support
for the party are people aged 30 to 65, who make up 25 percent of AfD voters, and people under
30.156 In addition to the reasons stated by FN supporters in France, AfD’s support stems from
frustration at not being able to express love for their country openly without fear of being called
a Nazi. “It’s time for Germans to be allowed to be proud of their country, just like all [other]
people.” A supporter argues, “I don’t think that because of these 12 black years of history
[referring to Nazi Germany] I should always have my head under the table. It cannot mean that
three generations later, we don’t have the right to demonstrate against things, to have another
opinion than the mainstream opinion.”157 While WWII guilt makes the country’s older
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population more sympathetic to the plight of refugees, the younger generation, who didn’t live
through these experiences, is frustrated by the constraints that the guilt places on their ability to
be patriots.
The voter demographic is foretelling for the refugee crisis because the younger
generation is a new force in the politics of the two countries. If they are voting in this manner
now, they will be voting this way in the future too, thereby strengthening fears that the countries
will be less welcoming to refugees in the future. Till date, traditional political parties have been
able to quash radical claims by far-right parties – either through forming coalitions and
withdrawing poorly polling candidates ahead of second-round elections in France,158 or by
instituting a 5 percent hurdle to the Bundestag to ensure that only parties with significant
national support can be represented in the German legislature. However, due to evidence of
increasing domestic pressure, politicians may be rendered helpless in stopping the far-right’s rise
and, as in the case of Merkel’s recent tough stances on immigration issues,159 will have to give in
to the pressure to remain in power.
Following the predicted continued upswing of nationalist parties in two of EU’s anchor
countries, the future of the supranational institution is called into question. The EU has always
been under attack by nationalist elements in its member countries. “The European integration
project was very popular among elites and citizens all the way up to the point when it changed its
character…For much of the postwar period, integration meant economic integration, and most
everyone was for it. Then when it changed to turn increasingly into a political project, such as
when national sovereignty was being transferred from national capitals to Brussels, that’s when it
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became controversial, especially among citizens.”160 With FN and AfD poised to make great
strides in France and Germany respectively, the EU is on shaky grounds.
The EU was praised for bringing peace onto the continent that was once ravaged by war.
However, to do so, leaders were required to integrate the economies and politics of its member
countries, which resulted in the creation of the supranational institution that we are familiar with
today. While integration promised economic benefits through the promotion of a common
market and market competition, and facilitated cooperation that instilled peace in the region,161
changing definitions of security in contemporary international politics to include economic162
and demographic163 facets, threaten its continued relevance in light of recent events.164 The
Greek debt crisis and the current refugee crisis formed “the perfect storm” for EU skeptics. The
debt crisis brought economic issues to the forefront by demonstrating the extent to which weaker
countries in Europe relied on stronger economies in the EU, and the economic uncertainty that
followed integration, while the migration crisis raised questions about the future of population
compositions, and underscored a need to protect borders and regulate the stream of migrants.165
FN and AfD have been successful in feeding on these feelings of uncertainty in order to attract
their voter base: 78 percent of AfD voters feared globalization as opposed to 45 percent of
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Germans overall, while 76 percent of FN voters were wary about the effects of globalization
too.166
If current trends continue, theory explaining the integration of the EU now predicts its
demise, if corrective action is not taken. One such theory is that of liberal intergovernmentalism.
This school of thought theorizes EU integration as “a series of rational choices made by national
leaders…[which respond] to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests
of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system,
and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments.” It rationalizes
support for European integration as a consequence of the preferences of national governments,
where “concrete preferences” emerged “from a process of domestic conflict in which specific
sectoral interests, adjustment costs and, sometimes, geopolitical concerns played an important
role.”167 As the Greek debt crisis revealed, in its current form, the EU does not align with the
macroeconomic preferences for the ruling coalitions in Germany and France since the system
exposes both countries to risks of downturn as a result of policies followed by countries in
economically precarious situations. Additionally, this scenario’s possibility is strengthened by
increasing support for far-right nationalist parties that oppose immigration and whose voters
support lesser involvement in global affairs. These parties are poised to make great strides in the
upcoming federal elections, implying that their policies will shape foreign policy in their
respective countries if predictions come true. Since Germany and France enjoy relatively greater
bargaining powers because they are the most powerful member states in the EU, the commercial
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interests of their domestic actors and governing parties will influence specifics of a new EU
treaty;168 this suggests that if the EU loses support within both countries, there could be possible
unraveling of the institution.
The third component of liberal intergovernmentalist theory highlights threats to the EU’s
survival due to its inability to fulfil its purpose for member states: “institutional choice” suggests
that EU integration was driven by governments’ “concern[s] about each other’s future
compliance with the substantive deals [that were] reached. In other words,…EU
governments…rely on them [EU institutions] to solve the second-order problems of control,
sanctioning, and incomplete contracting – mainly through credible pre-commitments.”169
However, as the recent failed attempt at collective action to respond to the refugee crisis
indicates, the EU has been unsuccessful in being able to enforce compliance from member states
for its policies. When countries like Hungary and Slovakia shirked the responsibility to help
refugees, thereby increasing the burden on other European states, European Commission
President, Jean-Claude Juncker reprimanded them for seeking to keep refugees out. He then
imposed an emergency quota system that spread out the vast number of refugees across EU
member states. However, the effort failed to compel Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Romania to adhere to the proposed system.170 This failure illustrates further room for loss of
support for the EU in Germany and France since they witnessed increases in their number of
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refugees due to the lack of cooperation by the aforementioned countries. Therefore, there is an
urgent need to improve functioning of the EU as it relates to achieving economic stability and
certainty in the region, and to use the EU mechanism in order to effectively tackle the refugee
problem. This area of study illustrates scope for further research.
The domestic pressures faced by the national governments of France and Germany on the
refugee issue are integral to determining the policies pursued by them. While the primary antiimmigrant party in France has already established itself in French politics over decades,
Germany’s most significant party, the AfD, is still in its nascent stages. This disparity between
the AfD and FN, in conjunction with a more generous French welfare state, explains why there is
more resistance to refugees currently in France than in Germany. However, in the future, both
countries show signs of being less welcoming towards refugees if the current trends continue. At
a larger level, the success of anti-immigrant nationalist parties spell trouble for the EU and its
continued viability. Using the framework provided by liberal intergovernmentalist theory on
European integration, I forewarn a decline in the importance of the EU – possibly even an
unraveling of the institution – due to its failure to align with economic goals of national
governments, as well as inability to secure compliance from member states for its policies.
Unless leaders within France, Germany and the European Parliament can demonstrate greater
success at sharing the burden of the refugee crisis, and reshaping the economic benefits from
integration under current global conditions – by reducing the uncertainties that are a result of
interconnectedness of economies of various levels of financial soundness – the increase in
popularity of FN and AfD in response to the refugee crisis might become the linchpin issue for
the beginning of the end of the EU.
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APPENDIX
Time Series Regression – France:
Variable

Observations Mean

ref_pop
fed_votes
reg_seats
govt_ssn
asy_flow
eu_turnout

26
27
27
21
25
27

0.0027483
0.1109222
0.1080702
0.3631113
0.0026193
0.4580704

Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
0.0005668
0.002102 0.0040882
0.0366709
0.043
0.1494
0.0388032 0.0610526 0.1889474
0.0202375 0.3383229 0.3958324
0.0010192 0.0010809 0.0042133
0.0435568
0.4063
0.5271

Table 1. Summary Statistics for Time Series Regression – France
year
year
fed_votes
reg_seats
govt_ssn
asy_flow
eu_turnout

fed_votes

1.0000
0.1877
-0.8660
0.9259
0.5349
-0.6361

reg_seats

1.0000
-0.2470
0.1536
0.4010
0.1318

1.0000
-0.8448
-0.6775
0.6793

govt_ssn

1.0000
0.6458
-0.8066

asy_flow

eu_turnout

1.0000
-0.5783

1.0000

Table 2. Correlation Matrix for Time Series Regression – France
Time Series Regression – Germany:
Variable
ref_pop
fed_votes
reg_seats
govt_ssn
asy_flow
eu_turnout

Observations Mean
26
27
27
21
25
27

0.100375
0.0275
0.013655
0.3154386
0.0066402
0.5003037

Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
0.0040952 0.0022837 0.0174724
0.0151327
0.0103
0.06
0.0150664 0.0004931 0.0824798
0.0101037 0.2973943 0.3300304
0.0049967 0.0012013 0.0218838
0.0809355
0.43
0.6228

Table 3. Summary Statistics for Time Series Regression – Germany
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year
year
fed_votes
reg_seats
govt_ssn
asy_flow
eu_turnout

fed_votes

1.0000
0.719
0.0533
-0.4043
0.7938
0.5657

1.0000
0.3954
-0.2778
0.8866
0.6802

reg_seats

1.0000
-0.2780
0.3763
0.7527

govt_ssn

1.0000
-0.2036
-0.1416

asy_flow

eu_turnout

1.0000
0.8247

1.0000

Table 4. Correlation Matrix for Time Series Regression – Germany
Panel Data Regression:
Variable

Observations Mean

ref_pop
fed_votes
reg_seats
govt_ssn
asy_flow
eu_turnout

52
54
54
42
50
54

0.0063929
0.0692111
0.0608626
0.339275
0.0046298
0.479187

Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
0.004682
0.002102 0.0174724
0.0504448
0.0103
0.1494
0.0558624 0.0004931 0.1889474
0.0288376 0.2973943 0.3958324
0.0041064 0.0010809 0.0218838
0.0678123
0.4063
0.6228

Table 5. Summary Statistics for Panel Data Regression
year
year
fed_votes
reg_seats
govt_ssn
asy_flow
eu_turnout

1.0000
-0.6254
-0.9714
-0.8526
0.2833
0.5848

fed_votes
1.0000
0.6335
0.6573
0.1838
-0.2525

reg_seats

1.0000
0.7991
-0.1461
-0.4370

govt_ssn

1.0000
-0.1161
0.6914

asy_flow

1.0000
0.5369

eu_turnout

1.0000

Table 6. Correlation Matrix for Panel Data Regression

89

